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Corporate Social Responsibility in the Russian Federation: 
A Contextualized Approach  
Abstract Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has emerged as a concept for business 
from within developed, Western economies. Such economies are underpinned by 
functioning institutions, where compliance with regulation is assumed. Recently, 
however, the ability of this traditional CSR approach to take account of the different 
economic and institutional arrangements found in non-Western contexts has been 
challenged. It has been argued that CSR research needs to be more contextualized, and 
that the Western interpretation and assumptions about what CSR is and how it is 
enacted needs to be broadened and challenged to take account of different stages of 
economic development. With this argument in mind, this article presents a 
contextualized critique of CSR undertaken in the Russian Federation. Based on a 
qualitative study involving managers within privatized Russian firms, this article 
explores the type, nature, and scope of CSR undertaken and attendant motivation of 
firms to engage in CSR practice. By taking account of the historical and cultural 
antecedents of both the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet transition period, the author 
reveals that while the market is driving conventional forms of CSR within some Russian 
firms, the historical legacy of both the Soviet Union and more recent political 
developments have a stronger influence on the type and nature of CSR undertaken. 
These findings challenge the assumptions about both the voluntary nature of CSR and 
the pre-requisites needed for CSR to take place. 
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Traditionally, CSR has been based on the assumption that firms will voluntarily 
(Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Crouch, 2006; Dahlsrud, 2008) engage in activity to address 
perceived responsibilities outside the firm’s legal and economic obligations; otherwise 
known as going “beyond compliance” (Davis, 1973). Recently, however, a number of 
scholars (Argandoña & Hoivik, 2009; Devinney, 2009; Dobers, 2009; Dobers & Halme, 
2009; Halme, Roome, & Dobers, 2009; Preuss & Barkemeyer, 2011) have challenged 
the capacity of this traditional CSR approach to take account of the different economic 
and institutional arrangements found within developing, emerging and transition 
environments. Halme et al. (2009, p. 2) assert that corporate responsibility is determined 
by “the institutional, legal and cultural setting within which business is practiced.”  
Preuss & Barkemeyer (2011) echo Halme et al. (2009) by asserting that, despite 
globalizing pressure for convergence within managerial practice, the national context of 
institutions, legal framework, and cultural antecedents can and does influence the way 
in which CSR is practiced. Consequently, the context within which business activity is 
enacted can determine the scope and nature of CSR practiced, leading to continued 
divergence across nation states. Thus in countries where institutions are weak, where 
property rights are applied inconsistently, and/or the enforcement of law is arbitrary, 
CSR may not be absent, but instead given a different “twist” (Dobers & Halme, 2009, p. 
242).  
Echoing this different “twist” (Dobers & Halme, 2009, p. 242), in a comparative 
study of firms in Turkey, Ethiopia, and Singapore, Robertson (2009) concluded that 
CSR is a concept “in flux” and will take different forms in different countries. 
Barkemeyer (2009), in a study of the CSR aspect of the UN Global Compact, concluded 
that Western approaches to CSR have limited use in non-Western context, particularly 
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in transition countries. Jamali & Mirshak (2007) note that where tax evasion, corruption 
and fraud are commonplace, a responsible company is one that complies with the law 
and codes of conduct, rather than going beyond it. Collectively these and other scholars 
(Baughn, Bodie, & McIntosh (2007); Blasco & Zølner, 2010; Chapple & Moon, 2005) 
argue that CSR research needs to be more contextualized, and that traditional 
assumptions about what CSR is and how it is enacted need to be broadened and 
challenged to take account of different stages of economic development. Without 
appreciating the institutional, legal and cultural context (Halme et al., 2009), 
understandings regarding the type, nature and scope of the CSR being undertaken in 
non-Western settings are likely to be misinterpreted or lost.  
As a result, interpreting CSR in non-Western locations has begun to gain some 
traction within the literature. However, despite increasing research on CSR in emerging 
and developing countries (Arli & Lasmono, 2010; Arya & Zhang, 2009; Muller & Kolk 
2010; Robertson, 2009; Visser, 2005), work examining CSR in transition countries 
outside of China (Darigan & Post, 2009; Li & Zhang, 2010; Lin, 2010; Xu & Yang, 
2010) has been lacking.  To date, this literature consists only of a small number of 
individual studies that draw very different and contradictory conclusions.  
McCarthy & Puffer (2008) for example, examine firm behavior in Russia using 
corporate governance as a substitute for CSR. Ray (2008) and Zueva-Owens and 
Fairbrass (2010) instead present single case studies. Ray (2008) describes Shell’s 
operations in the Sakhalin region, depicting a multinational company “doing” CSR in 
Russia, whilst offering no reference to the activity of indigenous firms. Zueva-Owens & 
Fairbrass (2010) present a case study of a hydro-electric power station in Siberia, 
examining the influence or lack thereof, of civil society shaping CSR practice in Russia. 
Conversely, Kuznetsov, Kuznetsova  & Warren (2009) use a self-reporting quantitative 
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survey of Russian firms to conclude that Russian managers do not view CSR as a 
legitimate activity for business, whilst Preuss & Barkemeyer (2011) use company 
reports to indicate that a significant proportion of large Russian firms do include CSR 
information within their external reporting, although often only in the English language. 
With only five studies employing differing methodological approaches, conclusions 
about the scope, nature and type of CSR practiced within individual Russian firms are 
difficult to draw. Similarly, studies from other eastern European countries add little 
clarity. Wildowicz-Giegiel (2010), in a study of Polish firms, found that CSR was 
limited to ad hoc philanthropy and charitable donations. Stoian & Zhania (2009) in 
direct contrast to the findings of Zueva-Owens & Fairbrass (2010) identified civil 
society as a key driver of CSR activity within Romanian firms. Koleva, Rodet-
Kroichvili, David & Marasova (2010), on the other hand, in a comparative study 
examining four central and eastern European countries, found that the legacy of the 
Soviet Union was the key driver of CSR.  
Thus to add clarity to the extant literature on CSR and to establish the extent to 
which CSR in the Russian Federation is contextualized, the author operationalizes 
qualitative data collected from firms in three industrial regions in the Russian 
Federation. The rest of the article is therefore organized into five sections as follows. 
First, the author examines the development and scope of CSR theory. The author then 
presents the Russian context within which she hopes to shed light. An overview of the 
methodology employed is reviewed before presenting the findings in a separate section. 
Conclusions are then drawn. 
 
The Development and Scope of CSR 
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Carroll (1991), in his now seminal work, viewed the obligations of the firm as a 
hierarchy ascending through: economic – making a profit for the shareholders; legal – 
obeying the law; ethical – doing no harm; and finally philanthropic – making a 
contribution to society. Within this framework, economic and legal responsibilities were 
viewed as mandatory; ethical responsibility was considered socially necessary; and 
philanthropic responsibility was considered socially desirable. Failure by the firm to 
engage with their total responsibilities risked the loss of legitimacy, resulting in poor 
commercial outcomes.  
More recently the issue of “legitimacy” has been folded into the reformulation of 
CSR as Corporate Citizenship (CC) (Wood & Logsdon, 2001). Rather than having 
discrete responsibilities towards the wider citizenry, the firm as a legal entity is itself 
viewed as a citizen, and thus its “obligations” are reconfigured as rights and 
responsibilities. By acting as a good “corporate citizen”, the firm can insure its 
legitimacy and in turn, its profitability. Establishing an obligation through legitimacy 
however does not resolve the limits of the firm’s social obligations. Nor does it indicate 
the extent to which firms should sacrifice profitability to ensure that these wider social 
obligations are met.  
Devinney (2009) asserts that the conceptualization of CSR can be viewed as 
both broad and narrow. A narrow approach assumes that these obligations are limited to 
those stakeholders who can make a credible claim on them. Proponents of this narrow 
approach include Lantos (2001) and Windsor (2006) who assert that CSR should only 
be pursued where it contributes to the strategic goals of the organisation, and thus reject 
the infusion of a political or social dimension into the scope of the organisation. This 
instrumental approach or “doing well by doing good” (Vogel, 2005) has led a number of 
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scholars to establish a link between corporate, social and financial performance 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Waddock & Graves, 1997).  
Conversely, a broad approach to CSR assumes that the firm should be an 
instrument of public policy, with obligations that extend beyond its immediate 
stakeholders. This more normative approach assumes that the firm will engage in CSR 
irrespective of the cost to the business, because it is ‘the right thing to do.’ Promoted 
primarily by Matten & Crane (2005) and Scherer & Palazzo (2007), this approach is 
grounded in the CC literature which views the firm as a corporate citizen with attendant 
rights and responsibilities (Wood & Logsdon, 2001). These scholars increase the level 
of obligation on the firm with respect to societal engagement. Matten & Crane (2005) 
assert that where the state is weak, the firm often inhabits a role more akin to purveyor 
of citizenship. In many developing countries, multinational firms are often found to be a 
substitute for the state, supporting services that would traditionally be provided by 
governments. However, substituting for the state can also create problems with 
legitimacy. To counter this legitimacy problem, Scherer & Palazzo (2007) contend that 
firms should involve a broad range of community stakeholders in CSR decision making, 
thereby diluting the firm’s discretion as to scope and nature of CSR undertaken. Within 
this broad configuration it is assumed that firms will adopt these wider obligations, not 
because they are compelled to, or because it makes commercial sense, but because it is 
“the right thing to do”. Taken at its most extreme, this approach alters the remit of the 
firm from being solely an economic entity to something more akin to the state or policy 
maker; an approach that Lantos (2001) and Windsor (2006) wholly reject.  
In debating the normative or instrumental nature of CSR, however, these 
scholars ignore why or under what conditions firms are likely to engage in CSR activity. 
Campbell (2007) and Matten & Moon (2008) assert that certain prerequisites are 
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necessary for CSR activity to take place. These prerequisites essentially mirror the basic 
tenets of a market-based economy. First, CSR requires a functioning market where 
firms have “discretion over their responses to market, social and political drivers” 
(Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 406).  Functioning institutions that administer the market and 
compensate for market failure are also required, alongside an active civil society able to 
hold the state to account. In addition, key actors, such as the state, business and 
government must not be “captured” or able to influence each other to improve their own 
situation at the expense of the public interest. Such pre-requisites ensure that key “actors 
operate according to some measure of mutual responsiveness, interdependency, choice, 
and capacity” (Matten & Moon, 2008, p. 407). In their absence, opportunities for 
“irresponsibility” increase. 
Looking for CSR in environments where these prerequisites do not hold raises a 
number of questions however. If legislative compliance has traditionally been viewed as 
optional, would a socially responsible firm be that which choose to comply with 
regulation?  If civil society does not function then maybe it is difficult for firms to 
gauge what society wants or demands from its organizations (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
If actors are captured, do firms voluntarily engage in CSR? Where more than one of 
these prerequisites of CSR do not hold, do firms configure their activity as instrumental 
(Lantos, 2001; Windsor, 2006) or normative (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007), or are different interpretations adopted? What do these different 
interpretations tell us about the nature of CSR in such settings? 
 Both Halme et al. (2009) and Preuss & Barkermayer (2011) contend that the 
national context of institutions, legal framework, and cultural antecedents can and do 
influence the way in which CSR is practiced. In this article therefore it is necessary to 
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appraise the Russian national context with a view to exploring the potential divergence 
in approach to CSR in this business environment. 
 
The Russian Context 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was seen as a tabula rasa on which to 
build a market-based economy. By the late 1990s, however, with firms operating in an 
institutional vacuum and supervised by a weak state (Gel’man, 2003), it was clear that 
this experiment had failed. In its place had emerged a “chaotic” (Lane, 2000) form of 
capitalism, dominated by corruption and the “unrule” of law (Holmes, 1997). This 
“chaotic capitalism” was accompanied by “over withdrawal” (Sil & Chen, 2004) or 
fragmentation of the state from areas where it has previously been responsible, led to: 
the displacement of monetary policy by barter surrogates (Woodruff, 1999); devolution 
of power from the federal center to regional fiefdoms (Stoner-Weiss, 1999); widespread 
corruption, non-payment of taxes, and organized crime (Holmes, 2008; Yakovlev, 
2001); weak institutions (Puffer & McCarthy, 2011); and the diffusion of “capture” by 
so-called “oligarchs” over the state (Hellman 1998; Solnick 1999). With the ability to 
shape regulation to service their own interests and to determine the makeup of regional 
and federal legislatures (Frye, 2002; Gustafson 2000), these oligarchs were in effect 
governing the Russian Federation in tandem with ruling elites (Hanson & Teague, 
2005).  
With his ascendancy to the presidency in 2000, Vladimir Putin engaged in 
vigorous attempts to restore the state’s capacity, strengthen the rule of law, and open 
Russia’s markets to global trade. In contrast to both the Soviet period, where the 
economy was closed to global markets, and the El’tsin era, where a lack of functioning 
institutions discouraged international trade, Putin sought to tighten the regulatory 
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framework to promote trade abroad, particularly in extractive and heavy industries. To 
this end, institutions were strengthened, money surrogates were outlawed, and the fiscal 
and judicial system overhauled in an attempt to reduce corruption, enforce property 
rights and increase tax revenues (Abdelal, 2010). Putin also remodeled the state’s 
relationship with the oligarchs, forcing some into exile and others into prison (Puffer & 
McCarthy, 2007) and took some strategically important industries – including defense, 
oil, and gas – back into state ownership (Vahtra,  Liuhto, & Lorentz, 2007). As a result, 
business-state relations moved first from “state capture” to “elite exchange” in which 
firms receive favorable treatment in return for providing benefits to state agents (Frye, 
2002; Rutland, 2001), and subsequently to business capture (Yakovlev, 2006). Business 
capture was achieved by creating a milieu of excessive regulation, meaning that 
ignoring regulatory requirements was no longer an option. However, by multiplying 
significantly the number of rules and regulations that every Russian firm had to abide 
by, all firms, no matter how law abiding, risked contravening at least one. Firms were 
therefore incentivized to acquiesce to the state if they did not want to be in receipt of 
excessive punishment, effectively giving the state “absolute dominance over business” 
(Yakovlev, 2006, p. 1054).  
The development of “business capture” (Yakovlev, 2006) emerged alongside 
other measures taken by Putin, and subsequently Dmitri Medvedev, to “manage” 
Russia’s democratic development. Since 2000 Putin has attempted to control the press 
(Rosefielde & Hlouskova, 2007) and federal and regional legislatures, with Putin’s 
“United Russia” party now dominating both (Wegren & Konitzer, 2007). At the same 
time, Putin also sought to manage or control Russia’s civil society development. Already 
weak at the time that the Soviet Union collapsed, attempts by third sector organizations 
and NGOs to invigorate Russia’s civil sector have been unsuccessful. Thwarted by a 
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lack of resources and a ‘closed shop’ mentality, most NGOs failed to either hold the 
state to account, or reach out to the wider public. The ability of groups to do so was 
further diluted by Putin passing a law in 2006 that prohibited domestic NGOs from 
accessing foreign donor money and introduced complex additional registration 
requirements for all groups (Kahmi, 2006).  Consequently, many NGOs have sacrificed 
their independence by taking state money to ensure their survival. As a result, the state is 
now unchallenged in almost all spheres of its activity, leading many to describe Russia 
as a “managed democracy” (Mandel, 2005; Wegren & Konitzer, 2007). 
Against this background of both corruption and subsequently increased state 
control, there is evidence that the legacy of the Soviet Union continued to pervade firm 
activity with respect to their employees and surroundings. During the Soviet period the 
firm performed a social as well as an economic function, providing individuals not only 
with guaranteed employment, but also subsidized housing, health clinics, childcare and 
so on. The paternalistic relationship developed during the Soviet period – between the 
firm, its workforce and its broader societal setting in the past (Kornai, 1992) – has 
continued to influence managerial behavior during transition. Although firms engaged 
in corrupt and sub-optimal behavior during the early 1990s period of transition, 
(Holmes, 2008; Yakovlev, 2001) managers also demonstrated a reluctance to shed 
labor, preferring instead to retain their social assets (Carlin et al., 1995) and keep 
employees on the books as unpaid, and usually underemployed workers, rather than lay 
them off (Ashwin, 1998).  
Thus, what constitutes CSR in a country with a history of non-payment of taxes, 
wages (Earle, Spice, and Peter, 2010) and corruption (Holmes, 2008), is likely to be 
different from that where fiscal and regulatory compliance was taken for granted. 
Similarly, CSR is likely to be enacted in a different way where some of the prerequisites 
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of CSR (Matten & Moon, 2008) are absent. A managed democracy (Wegren & 
Konitzer, 2007) and business capture are likely to provide different CSR outcomes to 
those environments where democratic processes and markets are not subject to state 
interference and control. Likewise, a managed civil society is unlikely to send clear 
signals to firms as to the type, nature and scope of CSR demanded by the general 
population, leaving firms to impose their interpretation of CSR onto local communities. 
In contrast, Putin’s focus on international trade gives Western firms greater access to 
Russian markets and vice versa. Thus, is it possible for open markets to influence CSR 
despite an absence of the prescribed pre-requisites? Given these factors in this article, 
the author seeks answers to the following questions: 
 
• What constitutes CSR in a country where regulatory compliance was once 
viewed as optional? 
• What impact does elite capture and stifled democratic development have on the 
type of CSR practiced? 
• What impact do open markets and globalization have on CSR activity? 
• To what extent is Russian CSR contextualized? 
 
Before these questions are examined in detail however, an overview of the 
research methodology is presented. 
 
Methodology 
This study, using information collected as part of a wider UK Economic and 
Social Research Council-funded research project, arises from three industrial Krai and 
Oblasti1 in the Russian Federation. The Oblasti of Samara and Volgograd and Stavropol 
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Krai were chose for our study because the urban centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg 
do not always represent the experience of organizations in provincial Russia (Javeline & 
Lindemann-Komarova 2010). In addition, as Moscow and St. Petersburg have been 
subjected to greater forces of economic and social transformation (Mansvelt 2005) than 
other areas of Russia, it is unlikely that findings in these two cities with regards to CSR 
and many other business practices would be representative of that found within firms 
outside of these them.  Moreover the majority of Russia’s population lives outside of 
these two cities, and due to the legacy of Soviet central planning, many industrial hubs 
and centers for manufacturing continue to be located outside of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.  
All three of the regions chosen for this study have a GRP (gross regional 
product) per capita within the Russian average (IMF Russia, 2008) and are 80% or 
greater ethnic Russian (Federal Statistics Service, 2011). During the Soviet period, 
Kybyshev Oblast’, as it was known until 1990, was a hub for automotive 
manufacturing. Today, Samara Oblast’, located in the Volga region, remains the home 
to the immense Lada Plant, AvtoVAZ in Tol’yatti, and is also one of the top areas of 
petroleum by-product and machinery production in Russia. It also three large oil 
refineries, located in Szyran, Novo-Kuibishevsk and Samara, and a hydro-electric 
power plant located just outside Tol’yatti on the Volga River. Volgograd Oblast’ has an 
economic profile similar to Samara Oblast’.  Its economic activity is concentrated in the 
region’s two largest cities, Volgograd and Volzhskiy. Leading industrial branches 
include chemical production, metallurgy and oil refining. Volgograd is also home to the 
largest tractor factory in Russia and a hydro-electric dam on the river Volga. 
Conversely, Stavropol Krai is a more agrarian based economy with industrial activity 
being largely based around the two cities of Budennovsk (oil refining) and 
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Nevinnomyssk (chemical production). In recent years, the Stavropol Krai’s economy 
has benefitted from increased natural gas extraction and the proceeds of the 
transportation of natural gas and oil from the Northern Caucasus, Caspian Sea and 
Central Asian republics, to Russia’s only warm water port at nearby Novorossiysk. 
Thus these three regions are not only representative of provincial Russian cities but also 
provide the study with a sufficiently similar context to examine contrasts and 
similarities between the regions, minimizing potential regional factors to act as 
explanatory influences (Miles & Huberman 1999)  
Huberman & Miles (1994) assert that an inductive research design is undertaken 
where the territory under enquiry is “excessively complex” and the intent is exploratory. 
Given the dynamic nature of Russia’s economic and social development and the lack of 
literature on CSR in Russian firms, an inductive research design was deemed 
appropriate. In line with an inductive approach, the choice of participants was 
consciously decided by the researcher because of their relevance to the study and their 
potential to help develop explanations for the phenomenon under examination (Mason, 
1996).  
Initially, a “wish list” of firms and interview subjects was compiled through 
internet searches, using the regional administration websites of each oblast to identify 
key companies. With the assistance of project partners located in Samara State 
University, Volgograd State University and Stavropol State Agrarian University, 
additional firms were located. In total, 43 firms were identified. The focus was placed 
exclusively on privatized industrial firms, domestically owned, wholly or in part. A 
wide range of manufacturing processes were also captured amongst those interviewed, 
including chemical processing, ship building, oil and gas, food processing and metal 
working. As a result the firms varied in size. 
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The majority of interviews were conducted in Russian and were all face-to-face 
and semi-structured. Theoretical debates within the CSR literature, particularly those 
pertaining to ‘context’ (Halme, et al., 2009), and the limited literature examining CSR 
in both Russia and other transition countries (Koleva et. al., 2010; Kuznetsov et. al., 
2009;  McCarthy & Puffer, 2008; Ray, 2008; Stoian & Zhania, 2009; Wildowicz-
Giegiel, 2010) were used to shape both the base-set of questions and data collection 
methodology.  
The focus of this base-set was not only on the type, nature and scope of CSR 
activity undertaken within each firm, but also managerial perceptions of what 
constituted CSR activity, and their motivation for undertaking such activity. This base-
set was subsequently refined in the field (Huberman & Miles, 1994), with questions that 
were misinterpreted or did not translate well being removed. An exclusive “beyond 
compliance” (Davis, 1973) definition of CSR was not adopted. Instead managers were 
allowed to define for themselves what they viewed as CSR activity within their own 
firm.  
The interviews were recorded using either a Dictaphone or in the form of 
ethnographic notes, where appropriate. Each interview lasted between 30 and 90 
minutes and assumed a conversation-like approach, where the base set of questions 
were used to facilitate discussion alongside additional follow-up questions to probe 
responses and to add further insight. All of the interviews were then translated and 
transcribed in situ, calling on the skills of the translator where discrepancies arose. 
Physical examples of CSR activity, including documentation, CSR policy statements 
and other activities, were also collected. Collecting this documentary data was done in 
order to increase the understanding of a firm’s CSR approach. The interviews usually 
involved one senior manager from each organization, though in a small number of 
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interviews two participants were involved in the conversation. Participants were varied 
in age and gender, and in their management positioning within the organization.  
Once back in the UK, the 43 interviews were subject to theoretical 
interpretation, based entirely upon the data collected, but with an appreciation of the 
context in which participants were speaking. The data were then analyzed, looking for 
patterns and similarities (Berg, 2007). Patterns and similarities were identified by 
repeated review and by passing the data to a research fellow who also studied the data to 
minimize the impact of personal preconceptions (Silverman, 1993). Themes emerged 
from this review (which are mapped onto the findings section in this paper) revealing 
different approaches to CSR namely, the influence of open markets, philanthropy, the 
legacy of Soviet business practices on CSR, and the impact of the post-Soviet political 
and economic environment on CSR, particularly within the larger firms in this study. 
The data were then coded according to these emergent themes (Charmaz & Mitchell, 
2001), using color coding. By coding for these themes the influence of the historical 
antecedents of both the Soviet and transition period on the type, nature and scope of 
CSR adopted within Russian firms were revealed, alongside the power of the market to 
influence CSR activity, even when other pre-requisites for CSR are absent. The 
discussion that follows explores these issues using narratives from these interviews, or 
‘illuminating examples’ (de Vaus, 2001, p. 240), to exemplify key points.  
In order to ensure that the organizations and the participants remain anonymous, 
and the data confidential, in the discussion that follows the data is referred to according 
to the adopted coding system. The firms are referred to according to their assigned 
pseudonym, which is indicative of the industry they are a part of, such as “Aluminum 
1.” A full list of the firms, under pseudonyms can be found in Appendix 1 of this article.  
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Findings 
Before the detailed qualitative results are presented, it is useful to present an overview 
of the data. Analysis of the transcripts revealed five distinct types of CSR taking place 
– these are described in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: CSR Types 
CSR Type Descriptor 
Market Driven (MD) CSR most closely reflecting Western descriptions of CSR; 
namely that which was driven by commercial concerns, went 
beyond compliance and was undertaken voluntarily 
Soviet Legacy or 
Philanthropic (SP) 
CSR informed by the paternalistic or social role played by 
firms during the Soviet Union 
Transition Legacy 
(TL) 
CSR influenced by the legacy of the El’tsin era where 
activities such as paying wages and taxes where optional and 
are now viewed as a firm’s “social contribution” 
Coerced (C) CSR reflecting the “captured” nature of state-business 
relations in Russia where firms take on social projects at the 
behest of the state. 
No CSR activity (N) No CSR activity was reported 
 
Thirteen firms in this study were engaged in MD CSR, Seventeen firms exhibited SL 
CSR activities, ten firms reported TL CSR and five firms described “coerced” or C 
CSR.  Finally, seven firms reported no CSR (N) activity at all. Overall fifty two 
incidents of CSR were reported, with twelve firms reporting engagement in two types 
of CSR – nine of which reported both MD and SP. A single firm reported three CSR 
types. All of the SP respondents were the single firm in their town or district. The five 
firms that reported coerced CSR were the largest by turnover in this study (Appendix 1 
details these findings by firm). To explore these findings in more detail, the following 
section is divided into two parts. The first examines incidents of market-driven CSR, 
motivated by a business case (Lantos, 2001; Windsor, 2006), namely MD and N. The 
second examines more “contextualized” (Halme et al., 2009) incidents of CSR 
influenced by the specific cultural and historical antecedents of both the Soviet and 
transition period, specifically TL, C and SP. A broader discussion of what this study 
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has to contribute to the continuing conceptual development of CSR is then entered into 
in the conclusions.  
 
Market-Driven CSR 
Firms found to be engaged in CSR activity that could be described as “traditional”, 
voluntary or “beyond compliance” (Davis, 1973) focused exclusively on the adoption of 
codified CSR policies and/or registration with the international environmental standard 
ISO14001. In all cases, these activities were adopted to gain access to export markets. 
Eight of firms in this study reported that they had a formal “social” policy that explicitly 
committed the firm to going beyond their legal and economic obligations. These 
policies were often wide ranging, committing firms to a broad spectrum of social and 
environmental projects, as illustrated by the extracts below from Aluminum 2 and Metal 
Working 1: 
Our corporate social policy is wide-ranging, including education, environmental 
protection, corporate social responsibility, health and social security – especially 
concerning families and children – and a sustainable partnership between 
charities and the business sector. (Aluminum 2, Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai’) 
 
Corporate social responsibility is an extremely important part of our wider 
corporate policy in all questions concerning production, labor safety and also 
ecology. Within that policy we also play a significant role in funding and 
supporting social activities in our region, including children’s organizations and 
financing charity work. (Metal Working 1, Volzhski, Volgograd Oblast’) 
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However, the arising wider social benefits from the adoption of a social policy both for 
the firm and its local community were not discussed by these managers. Instead, they 
stressed the arising commercial benefits, particularly as they pertained to overseas 
customers and contracts. Chemical 4, Natural Resources 1 and Aluminum 3, for 
example, stressed the link between legitimacy and commercial longevity (Carroll, 
1991), citing “reputation”, “image” and “legitimacy” (with respect to their customers) 
as strong motivators for their adoption. Others were more explicit about the direct links 
between the adoption of a social policy and profit, focusing on the “stimulus” 
(Cosmetics 2) provided by the market, as illustrated by the following discourse;  
 
You know, to survive today in the modern world, in today’s tough market 
conditions, we cannot survive without having a serious corporate social policy 
and especially in taking extremely seriously ecological questions. The market is 
the driver here without doubt, in our shifts towards, in particular, [sic] the 
ecological modernization across our factory. (Metal Working 1, Volzhski, 
Volgograd Oblast’) 
 
In citing the demands of customers and the need to ensure “stable profits” (Automotive 
1) these firms were focused much more on the ‘doing well’ aspect of CSR than the 
“doing good” (Vogel, 2005). Adopting a codified social program, or being able to 
demonstrate social responsibility credentials was viewed as essential not just of the 
ongoing legitimacy of the firm vis-à-vis its customers, but to gain access to and secure 
contracts from customers located in developed economies where such things are viewed 
as standard. This observation was reinforced by further scrutiny revealing that these 
eight and an additional five firms had also sought ISO14001 certification, again to 
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secure access to overseas markets. As dialogue from Cosmetics 2 and Chemical 4 
explains: 
 
All of the firm’s ecological standards comply with European environmental 
standards ISO14001. This is extremely important for us; it is an absolute must, a 
prerequisite for our work today. We must react to the demands of our buyers. 
Our main buyers are European firms… These global firms demand the highest 
standards, especially in the area of environmental responsibility and thus, in 
order to continue working with them, we must comply. (Cosmetics 2, 
Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai) 
 
Market mechanisms are dictating that we keep up with these changes. Our 
products need to be ‘green’ now in the eyes of our customers. (Chemical 4, 
Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’) 
 
Other firms stressed similar motives, including “competitive advantage” 
(Aluminum, 1; Chemical 7; Metal Working 1), “economic efficiency” (Chemical 3; 
Chemical 9) and “access to overseas markets” (Natural Resource 5). Yet none referred 
directly to any arising environmental or social benefits from ISO14001 certification. 
ISO14001 also had other limits. Discourse at other firms indicated that the pressure of 
overseas contracts needed to emanate from the right geographical location. A number 
stated that while they had obtained the international quality standard ISO9000, 
ISO14001 certification was not necessary because their customers, predominantly from 
the former Soviet Union, did not require it. Managers at Tractor 1 explained: 
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For us, the ISO 9000 system is fine and works well. For our clients in Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, this is the most important thing. They are not 
so worried about ISO14001. (Tractor 1, Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’) 
 
Others stated that ISO14001 was “too expensive” (Chemical 1) “difficult to justify” 
(Pipe 1) or like Tractor 1 that it was not “demanded by their customers” (Ceramics 1). 
 Collectively this discourse indicates that while some market driven, 
“voluntary” or “beyond compliance” activity is being undertaken, its scope is very 
limited.  In adopting a “profit is paramount” (Chemical 4) approach, the focus of this 
CSR is extremely narrow (Devinney, 2009).  Where CSR can assist in extending the 
commercial life of the firm, it was embraced, be that through codified policies or 
adherence to international standards. Where it did not it was rejected, as illustrated by 
managers at Pipe 1 when discussing environmental protection and pollution control:  
 
Our owners think that taking the environment seriously involves a lot of 
money, which they consider simply as a waste of money. They follow a clear 
logic. Why bother doing something which is expensive for the firm if it is not 
compulsory? (Pipe 1, Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’) 
 
By emphasizing the commercial benefits of this market driven CSR to the exclusion of 
any social value, it is unlikely that these firms would have engaged in this CSR activity 
without the market incentive. This market-driven approach is underscored by the 
rejection of ISO14001 certification by those with customers inside the former Soviet 
Union. Despite this “narrow” (Devinney, 2009) focus, however, the influence of 
overseas customers on the behavior of these firms indicates that market forces can still 
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promote “beyond compliance” (Davis, 1973) activity, even when other prerequisites 
for CSR such as functioning institutions and non-captured actors (Campbell, 2007; 
Matten & Moon, 2008) are absent. The presence of other types of CSR, not motivated 
by market forces, but by the antecedents of both the Soviet Union and the transition 
period at other firms in this study underlines this finding, indicating that prerequisites 
may not be necessary for CSR to take place. It is therefore to this “contextualized 
CSR” that the author now turns.   
 
Contextualized CSR 
Just over half of the firms in this study exhibited CSR activity that was motivated not 
by commercial reasoning, but by the antecedents of either the Soviet Union or the 
transition period. Those influenced by the cultural legacy of the Soviet period were 
strongly aligned to philanthropic activity as the primary vehicle for social intervention, 
with many stressing the need to ensure the wellbeing of their employees and their 
families. Those influenced by the transition period cited paying taxes and health and 
safety – issues that would be viewed as compliance activity in a Western setting – as 
their contribution to Russian society. Others, particularly larger firms, appeared to be 
“captured” by regional state actors. As a consequence these firms were compelled or 
coerced into CSR activity that they would not have otherwise undertaken. These 
findings are outlined in the analysis below. 
 
Soviet Legacy and Philanthropy 
In this study 17 firms found to be engaged in activity that could be described as 
charitable or benevolent. Some engaged in this activity on an ad hoc basis:  
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We try and sponsor as many local charities as we can. People and organizations 
in the local population come to us all the time and ask us for some philanthropic 
support. When we can, we are happy to oblige. (Natural Resources 2, 
Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’) 
 
While others took a more structured approach:  
 
We have two large programs. The first is “My Birthday”. When the child is born 
on the day of the company’s birthday, this child’s parents get 10000 rubles, 
presents, gift certificates during the festive ceremony. The second program is 
Polyakov Scholarship. It is worth mentioning that the scholarship is for students 
carrying out the best projects in motor-car construction and mechanical 
engineering. (Automotive 1, Tol’yatti, Samara Oblast’) 
 
Be it ad hoc or structured, the type and nature of the activities undertaken at each of the 
firms was very similar. Several firms sponsored bursaries, scholarships and educational 
prizes at schools and Universities in their region. Aluminum 3 for example sponsored 
students at Samara State Aerospace University, and both Automotive 1 and 3 sponsored 
students and prizes at Tol’yatti State University, all in their field of expertise. Two firms 
sponsored orchestras in their relative towns (Automotive 1 and Chemical 8) whilst half 
sponsored children’s projects, ranging from playgrounds to orphanages and health care 
programs (Chemical 1, 5, 8; Natural Resources 1, 4, 5; Metal Working 1, Aluminum 1).  
There were potential “commercial” benefits to this type of activity. Sponsoring 
students at related Universities gave firms direct access to the best and the brightest. 
Sponsoring orchestras was good public relations. However, when prompted to share 
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their motivation for engaging in philanthropic or charitable activity managers, in 
contrast to those with codified social programs or ISO14001 certification above, failed 
to stress these benefits. Instead they described philanthropy as a “concept [that] existed 
in Soviet times” (Aluminum 1), a “traditional” (Aluminum 1) role for the firm to take, 
and that this philanthropic activity was part of an ongoing “social contract” (Metal 
Working 1) with the local community that predated the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Evidence of this approach to CSR was even more pronounced in so-called ‘city 
forming’ enterprises in each region.  
Firms around which an entire town, city or district within a city was built were 
colloquially described during the Soviet period as “city forming” enterprises. These 
firms would not only provide the lion’s share of the employment in that town, city or 
district, but also administered community facilities (Kornai, 1992). This legacy 
appeared to be a key driver of CSR within these firms, as the dialogue below illustrates: 
 
Being the city-forming enterprise [sic] and being aware of our continuing social 
responsibility we continue to voluntarily undertake obligations in the life of 
Togliatti Urban district population through our Tol’yatti Community 
Foundation.  For example, environmental activities, vocational training support, 
culture and sport support, helping social groups and public associations and 
charitable/philanthropic activities. We also maintain a huge medical department, 
a polyclinic with serves 120,000 people at our own expense. (Automotive 1, 
Tol’yatti, Samara Oblast’) 
 
We still have some “social” roles also which have continued from the Soviet 
times. In the Soviet times, the factory built several schools and a theatre for its 
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workers and also had its own sanatorium near the Black Sea. These facilities 
were owned by the factory but they were used by the factory’s workers and their 
families. These facilities were either free to use or heavily subsided. Today, the 
factory tries to do what it can and continues to support these social projects and 
subsidies for these activities. This is important so that the workers have a feeling 
of “self-worth” and so that they feel they belong to the wider family which is 
based around the factory. (Chemical 1, Volzhskii, Volgograd Oblast’) 
 
In probing their motivation for continuing this activity, Aluminum 3 stressed that their 
“responsibility” was to those people who lived and worked in the immediate vicinity of 
the factory, while Chemical 5 stated: 
 
The Russian Federation has been a Soviet country for about 70 years, with its 
special ideology and mentality deeply rooted in people’s minds. Most of them 
got used to relying on enterprises forming a company town and budget-forming 
ones, supporting and backing the whole city… So we do understand that our 
responsibility is based on some historical traditions and culture in general. That 
is why we try to maintain or assist with as many of these previous functions as 
we can. (Chemical 5, Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai) 
 
The discourse in this study illustrates that “city forming” and other privatized 
enterprises have chosen to continue to occupy a role that previously was part of their 
mandate as a Soviet enterprise. Previously, the structures of central planning compelled 
such firms to be both economic and social providers within their local communities. 
Social benefits such as housing, kindergartens, health centers, social clubs, cheap 
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holidays, and in some cases access to luxury goods such as motor vehicles, were both 
provided and administered by the organization but were also used as benefits to 
incentivize the workforce. Clarke et al., (1994) even go as so far as to state that the 
purveying of these social assets was at the foundation of the Soviet production system. 
Rather than monetary reward for labor output, this form of ‘embedded’ (Clarke et al., 
1994, p.186) paternalism was both expected by the workforce and used to maintain 
production targets, thus keeping the factory doors open.   
 In the present one can see the continued influence of these Soviet antecedents 
within Russian firms as they express a continuing paternalistic approach to the 
organization’s role. The sense of “ought” or normative compulsion to their continuation 
of this activity indicates that these firms do not view CSR as something that was 
imported into the Russian Federation. Instead it was a “traditional” approach to 
philanthropic activity; the way things have always been done. Yet this activity was also 
more akin to “purveying” (Matten & Crane, 2005) social benefits onto their immediate 
surroundings, rather than engaging local communities to influence the type and nature 
of the activities undertaken. There was no evidence from the interview discourse that 
firms actively engaged or collaborated with community groups or NGOs in the decision 
making process with regards to this philanthropic activity (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
This lack of NGO interaction is not surprising as during the Soviet period firms engaged 
or purveyed a social function without any reference to community preferences. The data 
clearly indicate both that larger or “city forming” firms undertook philanthropic activity 
despite an absence of pre-requisites for CSR. In addition, it was also clear that these 
firms did not view CSR as a Western or imported construct. Rather, it was a 
continuation of activity undertaken under central planning.  
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Transition Legacy and Coercion 
In contrast to that presented above, the economic and political precursors of the 
transition period appeared to influence the scope, nature and type of CSR undertaken at 
fifteen firms in this study. Ten firms cited activity which in a Western context would be 
viewed as mandatory and thus not CSR, such as paying taxes and ensuring the health 
and safety of their workers, whilst others reflected the captured nature of business-state 
relations in Russia at the current time. Yet five firms reported that the state had 
“coerced” them into engaging in social projects that would have normally outside of 
their purview, reflecting the “captured” nature of business elites currently in Russia.  
Jamali & Mirshak (2007) note that where tax evasion, corruption and fraud are 
commonplace, a responsible company is one that complies with the law and codes of 
conduct, rather than going beyond them. Against the background of corruption, lack of 
regulatory enforcement and tax fraud that dominated the early part of the transition 
process (Earle et al., 2010; Holmes, 2008), it is not surprising that some firms asserted 
their social responsibility through regulatory compliance, as illustrated by the following 
discourse: 
 
We pay taxes every year and I employ over one hundred people. I see this as 
playing my role in the development of Stavropol. (Construction 1, Stavropol, 
Stavropol Krai) 
 
We provided for the welfare of a large number of people by paying large 
amounts into the city through taxation every year. This is our social 
contribution. (Chemical 1, Samara, Samara Oblast’) 
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Yes, of course, "social” questions are very important for our factory. We 
understand that we have a responsibility towards our personnel. We aid our 
workforce as we can. We guarantee that we will provide them with a safe and 
healthy environment in which they can work. (Asbestos 1, Volzhskii, 
Volgograd Oblast) 
 
Other participants, in line with Construction 1 and Chemical 1, asserted that paying 
taxes was “their contribution” (Lime Processing 1) and that, as they were on one of the 
‘biggest tax payers in the city’, this contribution to society was “enough” (Chemical 8). 
Others, like Asbestos 1, focused on the provision of health and safety as their attempt to 
address social issues. Automobile 3 stated that their priority was to “protect” the health 
of their workers, while others had introduced a system of “labor protection” (Chemical 
1, 4; Food Processing 2) to ensure worker safety. 
If a traditional approach to CSR is taken, then these responses do not represent 
evidence of CSR. Paying taxes is mandated by the state, providing employment is a 
necessary function of business and ensuring employee safety is now accepted as a 
standard activity for firms in a Western context, with employee protection etc., being 
mandated by law. The application of the historical and cultural antecedents of Russia’s 
transition however contextualizes CSR (Halme et al., 2009) in this setting. Asking 
Russian managers what they view as CSR or as their contribution to their local 
community did not necessarily evoke a textbook response. During the early 1990s firms 
had the choice of whether or not to pay taxes and wages. Many chose not to, with little 
or no penalty (Holmes, 2008). When asked what contribution firms made to their local 
community, firms in this study alluded to activities that they previously viewed as 
optional, but now feel are necessary or at least unavoidable.  
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However, the political and economic antecedents of transition had other impacts 
on CSR. The captured nature of business-state relations in Russia (Frye, 2002; 
Yakovlev, 2006) had also led to firms being coerced into CSR projects that were not of 
their choosing. Where the state was unable to provide particular “social” assets, it 
turned to the largest and/or most profitable firms in their location to provide it for them, 
as indicated by the following discourse: 
 
You know, sometimes the authorities set up social projects such as building a 
new sports center or nursery and then the authorities seek to attract “sponsors” 
for the financing of these projects if their own finances fall short. Of course, 
they turn to large, local companies, like our factory in the first instance. 
(Chemical 2, Volzhski, Volgograd Oblast’) 
 
The city’s sports stadium was owned and financed by another firm in this 
region, for the people of Nevinnomyssk. A few years ago this firm had 
problems and needed to sell it… The authorities therefore “asked” our factory to 
buy the stadium and maintain it for the city’s sporting events. (Cosmetics 2, 
Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai) 
 
This discourse illustrates not only the nature of these coerced projects but also 
the scale. Chemical 2, 3 and Metal Working 1 were assisting with the construction of 
new apartment blocks and health facilities. In Samara Oblast’, Ceramics 1 had 
reconstructed and was maintaining the botanical gardens, supplying free labor and all 
the materials. In Volgograd Oblast’, Natural Resources 1 was providing the fuel and 
repairs at the “Mamayev Kurgan” monument to the Great Patriotic War on the banks of 
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the Volga. Firms acquiesced to these (in most cases very large) demands because of the 
potential benefits it could bring in terms of a better working relationship with the state; 
“of course, we are not obliged by law to participate in these projects but we need to 
keep good relations with the local powers that be”, (Chemical 2; Cosmetics 2), to 
“maintain legitimacy” (Chemical 3) or to “secure the future state support” (Chemical 3). 
These examples, and discourse at other firms, illustrate that if firms refused an 
approach by the state to provide assistance, they risked the weight of “excessive 
regulation” (Yakovlev, 2006) as a result. Consequently, firms had little choice but to 
comply if they were to retain a working relationship with the state. In probing their 
attitudes towards this matter, firms exhibited a resigned acceptance, as captured 
succinctly by Metal Working 1: 
 
This is how things work here now. This is the modern form of corporate social 
responsibility. (Metal Working 1, Volzhski, Volgograd Oblast’) 
 
Traditional approaches to CSR assume that – whether motivated by an 
instrumental or normative bias – it is entered into voluntarily. Yet as these data in a 
different context illustrate, CSR may not always be voluntary. Russian firms that are 
“coerced” into CSR projects substitute for the state (Matten & Crane, 2005) but this 
coercion can still result in the firm making a significant contribution to its wider 
community. These findings, along with those vis-a-vis taxation and employment above, 
illustrate that CSR in different contexts can have a different “twist” (Dobers & Halme, 
2009). Where traditional definitions are set aside, different types of CSR are revealed. 
The concluding section below explores the implications of these and the other findings 
in this article.  
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Conclusions 
Before discussing the conclusions arising from this study, it is necessary to 
acknowledge its limitations. The study presents findings from privatized firms from 
three provincial, largely industrial regions of the Russian Federation. Care must 
therefore be taken in extending the conclusions drawn here to more rural Oblasti or the 
autonomous republics situated within the Russian Federation’s borders. In addition, this 
article focused exclusively on privatized firms. Firms that pre-date the collapse of the 
Soviet Union are more likely to exhibit characteristics, or the cultural legacy, of central 
planning. A study that focused on private firms or a mix of private and privatized may 
not have found the Soviet legacy to be so influential, and thus may be less likely to 
assert the paternalistic role of the enterprise in responding to questions about CSR. 
Additionally, interpretations or the influence of cultural factors on CSR prior the Soviet 
period are not explored in this study. The immediate post-revolutionary period was 
dominated by mass industrialization from what was previously a largely feudal society. 
As a result, few, if any firms remain from the pre-Revolutionary period.  Thus this 
research focuses the impact of this mass industrialization and associated central 
planning alongside the economic turmoil linked with transitioning from this economic 
approach.  These factors notwithstanding, the findings do give an insight into the 
contextualized nature of CSR conducted within privatized firms in industrial locations 
within provincial Russia, indicating that while traditional, “beyond compliance” CSR is 
taking place, CSR influenced by the cultural and economic antecedents of both the 
Soviet Union and the transition period is also commonplace. These findings have a 
number of implications for the extant literature on CSR in transition and challenge 
many of the assumptions within the current CSR theory, as explored below.  
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First, there are both similarities and contradictions when these findings are 
compared to those within the limited literature on CSR in the Russian Federation and 
other former Eastern Bloc countries. Commensurate with findings in this study, Koleva 
et al. (2010) also found that the legacy of the Soviet Union was the key driver of CSR 
within privatized firms whilst Wildowicz-Giegiel (2010) found that CSR was limited to 
philanthropy and charitable donations in Polish firms. Conversely, this study found little 
evidence to support Kuznetsov et al.’s (2009) assertion that Russian managers did not 
view CSR as a legitimate activity for business. Echoing Preuss & Barkermayer’s (2011) 
findings, even if a strict ‘beyond compliance’ definition is taken, around a third of the 
firms in this study were engaged in CSR activity for commercial benefit. Only seven out 
of the 43 firms in this study failed to report any CSR.  Also, contrary to Stoian & 
Zhania (2009) this study found no link between civil society activity and CSR within 
individual firms. Instead, in line with the findings of Zueva-Owens and Fairbrass 
(2010), firms failed to engage or collaborate actively with community groups with 
regards their CSR activity. This failure was not surprising given the “managed” nature 
of Russia’s civil society. Thus while these findings do contribute to the extant literature 
on CSR in transition countries, it is clear that more research needs to be undertaken to 
clarify the exact nature and motivations of firms engaged in CSR in this context. This 
need notwithstanding, the specific findings in this article do challenge a number of 
assumptions within the CSR literature.  
Findings in this study indicate that failure to take a broader view of what CSR is 
and how it is enacted, to appreciate the legal, institutional and cultural context will 
result in incidences of CSR being missed. For example, as a result of the lawlessness 
that dominated the early transition period, CSR in the Russian context appeared not 
only to be about going “beyond compliance” (Davis, 1973) but about being able to 
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demonstrate that you were compliant with the law. Echoing Jamali & Mirshak (2007), 
respondents highlighted regulatory obligations, like paying taxes and ensuring 
employees safety, as their “social contribution.” This approach illustrates that CSR is 
both open to interpretation within local contexts and that CSR is not always limited to 
activity beyond that which is legally mandated; factors currently absent from debates on 
CSR theory.  
Conventional thinking also assumes that CSR can and must only be “voluntary” 
(Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Crouch, 2006; Dahlsrud, 2008) as it encapsulates only that 
activity which goes “beyond compliance” (Davies, 1973). Although in this study the 
type and nature of coerced CSR varied significantly, its presence illustrates that, within 
particular national contexts, the voluntarily nature of CSR can be and is challenged. 
This differences in approach to CSR again illustrates that CSR is enacted differently 
when cultural, legal, and institutional frameworks are applied which differ from those 
found within developed Western economies; yet current CSR theory fails to take 
account of this reality. 
Also, in light of the absence of a functioning civil society and non-captured 
actors (Yakovlev, 2006), the findings in this study call into question the so-called 
prerequisites for CSR asserted by Campbell (2007) and Matten & Moon (2008). While 
these scholars assert that functioning markets, an active civil society and an absence of 
non-captured actors are necessary for CSR to take place, there was clear evidence that 
international trade can drive CSR, even where these “prerequisites” were absent. CSR in 
the absence of these prerequisites once again challenges assumptions within the extant 
literature, illustrating that broadening and contextualizing CSR means adopting or 
assuming wider or differing interpretations of what CSR is and the conditions necessary 
for it to take place. 
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Finally, firms also appeared to promote different motivations for engaging in 
CSR. Those firms motivated by commercial factors exhibited a purposeful instrumental 
approach (Lantos, 2001; Windsor, 2006), focused much more on the “doing well” than 
the “doing good” (Vogel, 1995). Conversely, those firms whose CSR was informed by 
the Soviet legacy exhibited a more normative motivation (Matten & Crane, 2005; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). By recalling the Soviet period in explaining their motivation, 
describing this activity as “traditional,” it was also clear that managers did not view 
CSR as something that was invented in the West. This view again challenges Western 
conventions about the antecedents of CSR. Assumptions that CSR is based on Western 
economic models dominate the literature, yet findings here illustrate that CSR and 
social interaction can emanate from other roots; in this case, central planning. Any 
acknowledgement that CSR is anything other than a Western construct is also, 
unsurprisingly, missing from the extant literature. 
Thus in conclusion, the degree of contextualization within Russian CSR is 
significant. As stated, if a strict “beyond compliance” definition is adopted, then only 
30% of firms in this study could be described as engaging in CSR. However by 
adopting a more nuanced and context-based approach this rises to 80% or 4/5th of the 43 
firms in this study. This confirms that failure to sufficiently contextualize the CSR 
literature will result in understanding regarding the type, nature and scope of the CSR 
undertaken in non-Western setting being misinterpreted or lost. It is therefore essential 
that more research in other non-Western settings needs to be undertaken in order to 
contest and/or widen the applicability of this article’s conclusions.  
In addition, research in other geographical areas where the extant literature is 
also scant, particularly in Africa, is also necessary. Such research is likely to add 
another dimension to how CSR is enacted and interpreted in non-Western 
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environments, and where actors in other contexts view the roots of CSR. Only by 
broadening the scope of enquiry and theoretical development can clarification be 
reached on what CSR is, and why firms choose – or not – to engage in it.  
Overall the findings in this article support Dobers & Halme’s (2009) call for 
CSR to be more contextualized, yet they raise more questions than they answer. 
Incorporating perspectives from transition and developing countries can and has 
pluralized the discussion on CSR, yet it is also reveals areas of theory may need to be 
revisited and re-examined. This re-examination is necessary if CSR is ever to be a 
concept that is not only useful at facilitating corporate social action, but really 
understanding what motivates firms in different locations with different cultural 
references to engage in CSR activity.  
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Appendix 1 
List of Firms (under pseudonym) in Study and Geographical Location 
 Firm Location CSR Type* 
1 Aluminum 1 Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai MD; SP 
2 Aluminum 2 Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai MD 
3 Aluminum 3 Samara, Samara Oblast’ SP 
4 Aluminum 4 Samara, Samara Oblast’ MD; SP 
5 Asbestos 1 Volzhskii, Volgograd Oblast’ TL 
6 Automobile 1 Tol’yatti, Samara Oblast’ TL; SP 
7 Automobile 2 Tol’yatti, Samara Oblast’ TL 
8 Automobile 3 Tol’yatti, Samara Oblast’ MD; SP 
9 Automobile 4 Tol’yatti, Samara Oblast’ N 
10 Ceramics 1 Samara, Samara Oblast’ C 
11 Chemical 1 Volzhskii, Volgograd Oblast’ SP; TL 
12 Chemical 2 Volzhskii, Volgograd Oblast’ C 
13 Chemical 3 Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’ MD; C 
14 Chemical 4 Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’ MD; TL 
15 Chemical 5 Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai SP 
16 Chemical 6 Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai MD 
17 Chemical 7 Samara, Samara Oblast’ MD 
18 Chemical 8 Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast’ SP; TL 
19 Construction 1 Stavropol, Stavropol Krai TL 
20 Cosmetics 1 Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast’ MD 
21 Cosmetics 2 Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai MD; C 
22 Engineering 1 Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast’ N 
23 Engineering 2 Svetlograd, Stavropol Krai N 
24 Food Processing 1 Stavropol, Stavropol Krai TL 
25 Food Processing 2 Svetlograd, Stavropol Krai TL 
26 Lime Processing 1 Zhigulevsk, Samara Oblast’ TL 
27 Metal Working 1 Volzhskii, Volgograd Oblast’ MD; SP; C 
28 Metal Working 2 Svetlograd, Stavropol Krai SP 
29 Natural Resources 1 Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’ SP; C 
30 Natural Resources 2 Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’ SP 
31 Natural Resources 3 Budennovsk, Stavropol Krai MD 
32 Natural Resources 4 Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast’ SP 
33 Natural Resources 5 Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast’ MD; SP 
34 Natural Resources 6 Samara, Samara Oblast’ MD; SP 
35 Natural Resources 7 Samara, Samara Oblast’ MD; SP 
36 Natural Resources 8 Novokuibyshevsk, Samara Oblast’ SP 
37 Pipe Factory 1 Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’ N 
38 Plastics 1 Syzran, Samara Oblast’ N 
39 Quarry 1 Zhiguliovsk, Samara Oblast’ C 
40 Ship Builders 1 Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’ N 
41 Tractor Factory 1 Volgograd, Volgograd Oblast’ N 
42 Waste Processing 1 Samara, Samara Oblast’ TL 
43 Waste Processing 2 Tol’yatti, Samara Oblast’ N 
*MD = Market Driven CSR; SP = Soviet Legacy and Philanthropy; TL = Transition 
Legacy; C = Coerced CSR; N = No CSR  
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1 An Oblast’ is an administrative region equivalent to a State of County. It has its own elected legislature 
and its own budget. A Krai is similar to an Oblast’ but significantly larger in geographical size, usually 
with greater ethnic diversity. The Governor of each Oblast’ and/or Krai is appointed by the President of 
the Russian Federation. 
